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In November 2017, the Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international human
rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity celebrated their tenth
anniversary, at which another group of international human rights experts and activists
adopted the Yogyakarta (Additional) Principles plus 10  to supplement the original text.
There has been widening acceptance across international organisations and increasingly
corresponding state practices, and of course, there is a need for a wider appreciation of
such norms. It is argued here, simultaneously, that it is necessary for a post-statist queer
methodology to intervene in this developing field in both law and politics in order to relax
the policing of identity upon a nationalised as well as gendered and sexualised body.
I would like to start with a scenario here that is displayed with three frames: Mr Randy
Berry, the first US Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons undertook a world
tour of 42 countries, and, in early February of 2016, he went to Jakarta to visit the
Indonesian government and civil society organisations. A few days before that trip,
Indonesia’s government officials in response to Berry’s arrival made numerous aggressive
statements. For example, on 25 January, Indonesia’s Minister of Technology, Research and
High Education, Mr. Muhammad Nasir, accused LGBT persons of corrupting ‘the morals of
the nation’. Meanwhile, recalling the ambivalence expressed by local activists – Dédé
Oetomo, the founder of Gaya Nusantara, the first LGBT rights organization in the country,
said in an interview, ‘when we frame it in rights, there has not been progress’.
Queer international law – echoing the advocacy of queer International Relations – targets
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the heteronormative idea of state sovereignty, which, in itself, is patriarchal and
paternalistic in normalising or discarding undesirable citizens and, nowadays,
primitive/non-liberal states, which are just not good enough (Lee, 2017). From the
perspective that the ‘international’ of International Relations and Law is a historical product
reflecting the competition between powers at both the domestic and international levels, in
this essay I consider the importance of politicising international legal discourse.
Queer Voices Necessary for International Studies
As the LGBT rights movements prosper globally, international lawyers have gradually come
to recognise that sexuality is significant in determining not only a person’s moral worth but
also a state’s progressiveness and legitimacy. In a similar vein, queer theory along with
poststructuralist feminist critiques have challenged our understandings of the body-mind
and self-other relationships since their emergence in the 1990s, alongside LGBT
identitarian politics. Nonetheless, such an innovative perspective has been considered
much less in international political and legal scholarship compared to queer theory’s legacy
in other social sciences (Weber, 2016).
With a few exceptions, most attention has previously been focused on conceptual
conflations such as sex/gender, sexual orientation/ sexual practices/ homosexuality, and
gender identity/ gender expression/ transgenderism/ transsexualism (Otto, 2015). Queer
theory matters when it comes to a human rights agenda that prioritises empowering
certain identifiable groups of people (Morgan, 2000; Swiebel, 2009). Namely, how do we
prevent the hierarchical, or even exclusionary, effect of the future agenda of human rights
in the name of global justice?
In terms of a brief history, the first occasion of a collective elaboration can be traced back
to the panel entitled Queering International Law (in response to the call for ‘The Future of
International Law’) in March 2007 at the 101st annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law. Much later, in December 2015, the conference on Queering International
Law, Possibilities, Alliances, Complicities, Risks at the Melbourne Law School assembled a
similar group of lawyers who posed questions regarding the unchallenged hierarchies of
power and knowledge in the state-centred law-making system.
Quite recently, in 2017, the first book on Queering International Law edited by Dianne Otto
was published. The contributors to the volume attempted to interrogate both the
possibilities and challenges of an unimaginable project – to queer (as a verb) international
law, a body of rules, norms and principles that has always presented the great deal of
inconsistency and fragmentation since the determination of the Cold War (Koskenniemi
and Leino, 2002). Today, queer theorists and methodologists have considered the
fundamental tension stemming from the state-centric, sovereignty-based ‘international’
relations (Dhawan, 2016).
Then, what is the significance of 2017? Recently, the Yogyakarta Principles have been
celebrating their tenth anniversary. There has been widening acceptance across
international organisations and increasingly corresponding state practices. As Michael
O’Flaherty (2015) reminds us, apparently there is much work to be done on further
‘appreciation of the application of the Principles’ (297). Simultaneously, I would argue that
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there is still a need for queer critiques to intervene to relax the policing of identity, including
not just the discourses that characterise one’s gendered body and sexual life but also the
ethno-cultural nationalism that determines the ‘sovereign community’ to which we are
taught belong (Balibar, 1990).
A post-statist queer theoretical approach attempts to deal with historical problems
concerning gendered and sexualised bodies in modern societies, yet it should not be
misinterpreted as refraining people from desiring to acquire a clear and fixed identity.
Beyond the dialectics between acknowledging and refusing an identity, queer theory’s non-
dichotomous perspective offers the possibility of affirming the multiplicity, and sometimes
the fluidity, of one’s self vis-à-vis what the social world imposes. The task of dismantling
oppression and destabilising the structures that maintain them is crucial – it not only
challenges the heteronormative system and gender binarism but also is sceptical of one’s
autonomy engaged in social relations of diverse power dynamics. Such questions are
applicable to an individual, a nation and a state.
Namely, queer scholarship does not target simply the international human rights regime but
also the fundamental premise of international law – the state’s pastorship. The metaphoric
imagination of state governance as mancraft is in itself patriarchal and paternalistic, taking
other states as rivals, in order to self-inscribe the plausible ‘delusion of sovereignty’ and
internationalism of this kind. In this respect, Cynthia Weber (2016) has introduced both
epistemological and methodological approaches to the field of International Relations. In
particular in an age of globalisation, international law has expanded its interests not only in
preventing conflicts between states but also in promoting and standardising human
flourishing and wellbeing in response to a call for global governance, which has subtly
changed the relationship between states and between a state and its people (Cheah, 2014).
Therefore, it is considered that there is still an urgent need to queer international human
rights law in particular, or international law in general, in order to counteract the taken-for-
granted patronisation repeatedly affirmed by states. However, such a vision does not
necessarily aim to overrule the efforts made in advocating the Yogyakarta Principles’
normativity. Rather, it refuses the simplification, whereby most international lawyers equate
conferring rights with attaining liberation. With the transnational emergence of the LGBT
rights movement, the framing of gay/trans/human rights discourse relies heavily on the
politics of identity and otherness oriented by the law of state sovereignty. A trajectory can
be outlined with the globalisation of sexual identities through queer people’s migration,
interactions between civil society organisations, as well as diplomatic relations between
states, and between states and international agencies (e.g. Langlois et al, 2017).
There is, thus, a need to address the problems left by strategic essentialism regarding sex,
gender and sexuality, and the overgeneralisation of cultural sovereignty endorsed by law. At
the same time, we may also have to face squarely the paradoxes of queer theory, especially
regarding its impracticality and ‘imaginative’ force. In this respect, queering international
studies (especially for international law), with its postmodern ontology, should be regarded
as postulating lex ferenda – the law of the future, as opposed to lex lata (the law of the
present) – based on the ‘critique of present institutions’ (Koskenniemi, 2012: 12). The
project of queer international law, bearing an obligation of self-reflexivity, acknowledges its
exercise of power in producing subjectivities and discourses while ‘finding, naming and
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situating the missing voice’ (Valdes, 1995: 346).
Nevertheless, overall, the opinio necessitatis – the sense of reformulating and reframing
the legal discourse based on ‘political necessity and reasonableness’ (Mendelson, 1998:
271) – of such a deconstruction project derives from the fact that the state-centrism
cannot properly address the lacunae where the rights-holders are beyond the scope of the
current institutions. As a step forward towards critically reimagining international law, I
argue that it is still crucial, in addition to the legal landscape, to prevent the risk of reducing
thorough social activism regarding sexual liberation to a rights campaign, or to a state-to-
state naming and blaming.
The Inevitable Subjectivation for Legal Protection?
What legal protection offers, as part of and simultaneously the result of subjectivation, is a
historical product that reflects the competition and selection between discourses and
entities. On 25 December 1991, Australia ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
allowing individuals to appeal to the Human Rights Committee (HRC). On the day it came
into force, Mr Nicholas Toonen, a leading member of the Tasmanian Gay Law Reform
Group, filed a complaint before the Committee, challenging the then Tasmanian Criminal
Code, which criminalised consensual sexual activity between adult men. At that time,
Tasmania had experienced an unprecedented popular and large-scale mobilisation of
homophobia. This was the very first case regarding homosexuality to resort to the
international human rights mechanism, for the rights to privacy and equality before the law.
Of course, several cases have been decided by the ECtHR since the 1980s, for example,
Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) and Norris v Ireland (1988), but the Toonen case was the
first one in which the issues around (homo)sexuality were put forward, with respect to
international human rights treaty law. The Committee’s landmark decision broadened the
interpretation that sexual orientation is included within the reference to sex related to the
non-discrimination provision. However, social struggles around sexual and gender diversity
emerged from a radical proposal for sexual revolution, which was thereafter simplified into
social movements fighting for equality before the law. It is now entrenched in notions such
as sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE).
Before sexuality was taken as part of one’s identity, it was primarily studied through a
medical gaze, which was infiltrated with ideological prescriptions regarding good/bad sex
(Warner, 2000). Through the line of probing people’s erotic desire and practices, sexual
orientation, which corresponds to another one’s sex/gender (Waites, 2009), has been
captured and located by moral and medical and thus legal judgments. In each field, people
are necessarily positioned in the ‘right’ place within hierarchies. For the sake of
empowerment in the rights language, sexual and gender identities have been made as a
necessary condition for rights entitlements (Douzinas, 2007), but, as Michel Foucault
(1997: 166) hesitated:
If identity becomes the problem of sexual existence, and if people think that they have to
‘uncover’ their ‘own identity,’ and that their own identity has to become the law, the
principle, the code of their existence; if the perennial question they ask is ‘Does this thing
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conform to my identity?’ then, I think, they will turn back to a kind of ethics very close to the
old heterosexual virility.
In the context mentioned above, such a pro-gay interpretation given by the HRC reaffirms
the characteristics of sexuality pertaining to one’s personhood, and has influenced other UN
Human Rights bodies and international and regional organisations (O’Flaherty and Fisher,
2008; Tahmindjis, 2005). For example, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health once
boldly claimed that ‘sexuality is a characteristic of all human beings…which defines who a
person is’ (Hunt, 2004, para. 54). The process of subjectivation is legitimised then by the
need for human rights protection.
Such a human rights agenda nonetheless has been challenged by queer theory concerning
its overgeneralisation of the heterogeneity between individuals and their lived experiences
in different societies (Langlois, 2015). Queer critiques are more compassionate towards
those who are unidentified – either because of rejection by oneself or due to misrecognition
by society – and hence underrepresented by activism and law (Weber, 2017; Wilkinson,
2017). As a response, international human rights lawyers have become careful when
codifying the rights of sexual and gender minorities, and advocates from the non-Western
world may refer to their social movement as a SOGIE-related one rather than an LGBT rights
campaign.
For example, many civil society organisations in Asia referred more to SOGIESC-related
(sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics) rights rather
than LGBTI rights when I attended the ILGA-Asia Conference in October 2015. Most of the
participants had considered adapting to community needs by situating the local knowledge
of sexual and gender identities within the international human rights framework. In this
light, the Yogyakarta Principles, endorsed by international human rights experts in 2006,
give a relatively open-ended definition of sexual orientation and gender identity that has
been cited by many international documents and domestic legislation (Brown, 2010).
In furtherance of de-policing minority victims with identities, international human rights law,
based on its malleable nature, is closer than other subfields of international law to ‘a
potential site of emancipatory struggles and of individual recognition’ (Jouannet, 2011: 21).
In this light, queer utopias, though variable, in contrast to purely international legal
positivism, which depends on states’ (un)willingness and (in)actions, are still desirable
(Douzinas, 2000; Hall, 2001). Regardless of the arguable origin of human rights, deriving
from human reason and dignity (naturalism) or based upon the textual codification of rules
(positivism) (Koskenniemi, 2011), the law at least ought to aim at liberating every rights-
holder – whether visible and identified or invisible and unidentified – from ongoing or
future suppression.
Queer International Law: Taking Politics Seriously
Projecting a trajectory of how the SOGIE discourse enters into international law enables us
to reconsider the profound influence of progressivist humanism upon the existing
international legal system. Based on the need to rewrite human rights’ conditionality, new
subjects standing out in international jurisprudence stem from opinio necessitatis of
authorising protected status for people who live on the margins of society. Although new
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rights of new humans are crystallisable via social movements from the local to the
transnational, in practice they still need to be formally recognised/permitted by states
through compromising their sovereign power, which assumes the monopoly of the
production of law and justice.
That is, international law governs the legal relations between recognised subjects – states,
on the one hand, self-authorised by default; and individuals and other non-state actors, on
the other, depending on their visibility and capacity. Despite the international call for sexual
and gender minorities’ rights, states withhold the primacy of the Westphalian system,
which is concerned with the sovereign’s supremacy over its population and domestic
affairs. In this vein, human beings are reduced to state citizens. However, from a queer
perspective, such a universalistic assumption – or fiction – regarding moral state and
cultural sovereignty is contestable. A reductionist approach to generalising lived
experiences of people, whether (perceived as) normative or deviant, actually undermines
each member’s investment in legitimating the state’s sovereignty based on people’s self-
determination.
Such taken-for-grantedness in effect reproduces the patriarchal-heterosexual matrix – ‘a
grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized’, as
defined by Judith Butler (1990: 151). Thus, to queer, as a transposition from a noun to a
verb, needs to identify one’s positionality – individually and collectively (marked and
assembled, voluntarily and involuntarily, along with other peers – compared to the
normative, including the presumed representation of people by their state (Butler, 2012).
The ascendance of the conceptions of SOGIE in law can do little to challenge the
overstated idea of sovereignty, but both identity-based rights and hence people-based
sovereignty have stabilised the status quo of modern international law.
Yet, Human rights are just like love, recalling Martti Koskenniemi’s (2011: 153) metaphor,
‘both necessary and impossible…Routine kills love, as it does to rights-regimes’. Such
identity-based narratives for individuals and states thus serve to normalise so-called
‘deviance’ and ‘non-conformity’ in the juridical realm, which, in effect, restricts the extent of
a revolution for gender equality and sexual liberty. The whole of a national culture within a
fixed territory over a population has been preconditioned to justify one state’s imagined
sovereignty (Bayefsky, 1996), and based on this precondition, the social movement agenda
is selectively approved by states, which consider the goal reasonable, namely culturally
acceptable.
That said, there is a dilemma in placing the crafted notion of sovereignty over law; namely,
the need for states’ protection and the limit of states’ attention. Modern international law is
state-centred and voluntariness-based, and states, personified as moral men who always
make rational and just choices, are presumed to legitimately represent the will of their
people, in which sovereignty is ‘an artificial soul’, in Hobbesian terms. Nonetheless, the
realities expose the inadequacy of this presumption in terms of human rights protection.
Indeed, the will of a state represents its people, in the name of people-based democracy,
which only voices the dominant ideologies in society (Olson, 2016). This kind of democracy
could be achievable by discarding minorities, when there exists no Rawlsian ‘veil of
ignorance’ in reality.
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In this light, law is ineludibly politicised by, and in turn politicises, the subjects it creates.
Thus, international law is not exempted from, but legitimises, mainstream ideologies in
both conceptual and empirical terms (Etxabe, 2016; Kochi, 2017). The inscription (or more
violently, imposition) of an identity upon a body, strategically applied to any human rights
agenda, assists knowledge producers ‘to rediscover the individual outside of the
mechanisms of power’, in Foucault’s (1988: 50) words. For international human rights, it is
not that what a human is matters; its answer, rather, reflects a value system concerning
sexual and gender norms seized by primary agents – national governments and the
scientific community.
The great danger here is the non-presence of the neglected rights-holders in history being
read as their non-existence – as Susie Scott (2018) argues for a sociological inquiry into
the symbolic meanings of ‘nothing there’ – and hence, historicising such absence becomes
an important task for international lawyers. This does not conflict with, but furthers the idea
contained within the international human rights regime in the post-Vienna Declaration era.
That is, it is the duty of all individuals and all forms of governments involved in constituting
their sovereignties, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote
and protect all fundamental freedoms of any other member under human rights norms.
Conclusion: Unpacking the Simplified Sovereignty
Queer populations, standing in between the normative and non-normative realms for a
liberal mind, is a good case that demonstrates the entanglement of international law and
politics. Despite several remarkable triumphs of the LGBT social movement, locally and
globally, discrimination by heteronormative fellows against those who are perceived to be
disobedient or simply forgotten and their abandonment by good sexual citizens of better
normalcy still exists and must be acknowledged and remedied (Richardson, 2004). A true
commitment to democratising sexual and gender politics should be accountable for all
measurements of social class in order to avoid hierarchical or exclusionary operations,
which are often seen in local societies between activists.
Understandably, the construction of self is ‘always a rapport of violence with the other; so
that the notions of…self-presence…are essentially dependent on an oppositional relation
with otherness’, as Derrida (1984: 117) contends. However, the politics of
identity/sovereignty as manifested in law should remain more cautious and attentive in
terms of universal rights and their holders. Queer international law, on the contrary,
submits an anti-essentialist and anti-reductionist proposal to prevent, or compensate for,
an oversimplification of diversities in the real world and the corollary of its crowding-out
effect.
For the rights of human race in the realm of international studies, the ‘international’ needs
to be deconstructed and reordered in a non-state centric and non-heteronormative manner.
The conventional human rights mechanisms should accordingly be advanced when there is
considerable demand. The relationship between a state and its people should not simply
rely on the given texts or the existence of the represented individuals (as positivists would
assert), but adapt to the social reality where liberation is needed. It is argued here for opinio
necessitatis of queer intervention in directing or effecting the construction of alternatives to
doing state sovereignty and international law.
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International (human rights) law, in an age of globalisation, is supposed to restructure the
relationship between the governors and the governed but, in fact, it has often become
subject to ‘the realpolitik of the world’ (Milanovic, 2012: 1035). While sexual and gender
norms that are transformed and translated into the international realm become stabilised
as identity narratives and soverign imagination in a collective manner, there remains an
uneven development across societies around the world concerning the ‘rights’ discourse.
Yet, resorting to a state-to-state nationalist competition is not a solution, particularly when
we face squarely the problem embedded in the politics of international law.
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